Ordinal potentials in smooth games by Ewerhart, Christian
  
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 265 
 
 
Ordinal Potentials in Smooth Games 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian Ewerhart 
 
 
 
October 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Zurich 
 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
  
ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ordinal Potentials in Smooth Games*
Christian Ewerhart**
October 16, 2017
Abstract. While smooth exact potential games are easily characterized in terms of the cross-
derivatives of playerspayo¤ functions, an analogous di¤erentiable characterization of ordinal
or generalized ordinal potential games has been elusive for a long time. In this paper, it is
shown that the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a smooth game with multidi-
mensional strategy spaces is crucially linked to the semipositivity (Fiedler and Pták, 1966) of a
modied Jacobian matrix on the set of interior strategy proles at which at least two rst-order
conditions hold. Our ndings imply, in particular, that any generalized ordinal potential game
must exhibit pairwise strategic complements or substitutes at any interior Cournot-Nash equi-
librium. Moreover, provided that there are more than two players, the cross-derivatives at any
interior equilibrium must satisfy a rather stringent equality constraint. The two conditions,
which may be conveniently condensed into a local variant of the di¤erentiable condition for
weighted potential games, are made explicit for sum-aggregative games, symmetric games, and
two-person zero-sum games. For the purpose of illustration, the results are applied to classic
games, including probabilistic all-pay contests with heterogeneous valuations, models of mixed
oligopoly, and Cournot games with a dominant rm.
Keywords. Ordinal potentials  smooth games  strategic complements and substitutes 
semipositive matrices
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lation Modeling; C72 Noncooperative Games; D43 Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market
Imperfection; D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and
Voting Behavior
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1. Introduction
When a strategic game admits a potential, playerspreferences may be conveniently summa-
rized in a single objective function (Rosenthal, 1973; Monderer and Shapley, 1996a). Potentials
of di¤erent types have been identied for a large variety of games. Moreover, the underlying
methods have been found useful for the analysis of oligopolistic markets (Slade, 1994), learning
processes (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Young, 2004), popu-
lation dynamics (Sandholm, 2001, 2009; Cheung, 2014), the robustness of equilibria (Frankel
et al., 2003; Morris and Ui, 2005; Okada and Tercieux, 2012), the decomposition of games
(Candogan et al., 2011), imitation strategies (Duersch et al., 2012), dynamics in near-potential
games (Candogan et al., 2013a, 2013b), the existence of Nash equilibrium (Voorneveld, 1997;
Kukushkin, 1994, 2011), solution concepts (Peleg et al., 1996; Tercieux and Voorneveld, 2010),
games with monotone best-response selections (Huang, 2002; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010),
supermodular and zero-sum games (Brânzei et al., 2003), and even issues in mechanism design
(Jehiel et al., 2008).
Both exact and ordinal variants of the concept have been considered in the literature.1 In the
case of nite strategy spaces, complete characterizations are known for exact and (generalized)
ordinal potential games. Exact potential games admit a convenient characterization also in the
important class of smooth games, i.e., in the class of games with Euclidean strategy spaces
and twice continuously di¤erentiable payo¤ functions. For instance, a smooth game with one-
dimensional interval strategy spaces admits an exact potential if and only if the Jacobian of that
game, i.e., the matrix of cross-derivatives of playerspayo¤ functions, is globally symmetric.
For the class of innite ordinal potential games, a useful characterization has been established
by Voorneveld and Norde (1997). Specically, a game admits an ordinal potential if and only
there are no weak improvement cycles and an order condition is satised.2 However, as far as
we know, no di¤erentiable characterization has been available up to this point for the classes
1For a real-valued function on the set of strategy proles to be an exact potential (a weighted potential),
the di¤erence in a players payo¤ resulting from a unilateral change of her strategy must equal precisely (up to
a positive factor) the corresponding di¤erence in the potential. For a potential to be ordinal, any strict gain
in a players payo¤ resulting from a unilateral change of her strategy must be reected by a strict gain in the
potential and, unless the ordinal potential is generalized, vice versa.
2For a rigorous statement of this important result, we refer the reader to Voorneveld and Norde (1997).
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of ordinal or generalized potential games. This has been a highly undesirable situation because
the ordinal notions are of considerable conceptual interest.3
The present paper addresses this long-standing issue by studying the local feasibility of a
generalized ordinal potential in a small neighborhood of an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium
(or, more generally, in a small neighborhood of any interior strategy prole at which at least
two rst-order conditions hold).4 To this end, we consider an arbitrary cyclic path that is
contained in a small open neighborhood of the equilibrium. In the simplest case, the path
runs along the edges of a small rectangular box that contains the equilibrium at its center. In
general, however, the path need not be centered, it may even be zig-zagging, crossing itself, or
forming a complicated knot. By shrinking the path to innitesimal size, we identify conditions
on the slopes of playerslocal best-response functions such that each players payo¤ is strictly
increasing over the respective edges of the path that reect her changes in strategy. Since a
strict improvement cycle is impossible in a generalized ordinal potential game (Voorneveld,
1997), this approach indeed delivers a set of tight necessary conditions for the existence of a
generalized ordinal potential in a wide class of games with continuous strategy spaces.
For example, it will be recalled that a smooth n-player game with interval strategy spaces
is a weighted potential game if and only if there exist positive weights w1 > 0; :::; wn > 0 such
that5
wi
@2ui(xN)
@xj@xi
= wj
@2uj(xN)
@xi@xj
(i; j 2 f1; :::; ng; i 6= j) (1)
holds at any strategy prole xN . Below, it will be shown that, at any interior Cournot-Nash
equilibrium xN of any smooth generalized ordinal potential n-player game, provided that cross-
derivatives do not vanish, there exist positive weights w1(xN) > 0; :::; wn(x

N) > 0 such that
wi(x

N)
@2ui(x

N)
@xi@xj
= wj(x

N)
@2uj(x

N)
@xj@xi
(i; j 2 f1; :::; ng; i 6= j). (2)
3Monderer and Shapley (1996a, p. 135) wrote: Unlike (weighted) potential games, ordinal potential games
are not easily characterized. We do not know of any useful characterization, analogous to the one given in (4.1),
for di¤erentiable ordinal potential games. Since then, the problem has apparently remained open. See, e.g.,
the recent surveys by Mallozzi (2013), González-Sánchez and Hernández-Lerma (2016), or Lã et al. (2016).
4As will be explained, local conditions such as those considered in the present paper cannot be sharpened
by considering additional strategy proles.
5Here, xi and ui = ui(xN ) denote player is strategy and payo¤ function, respectively, where xN = (x1; :::; xn)
is the corresponding strategy prole. The notation will be introduced more carefully in Section 2.
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Thus, any smooth generalized ordinal potential game satises a local analogue of the global
di¤erentiable property of a weighted potential game at any interior equilibrium.6 Moreover, as
will also be seen, this condition implies rather tight restrictions in specic classes of games. In
this sense, a (partial) di¤erentiable characterization of generalized ordinal potential games with
continuous strategy spaces is obtained.
The analysis starts by considering strict improvement cycles that involve two players only.
For this case, the existence of a generalized ordinal potential is shown to imply that the product
of the slopes of any two playersmutual local best-response functions (or, more generally, the
product of the corresponding cross-derivatives) at any interior regular equilibrium must be
nonnegative.7 Thus, borrowing the terminology familiar from contributions such as Bulow et
al. (1985), Amir (1996), Dubey et al. (2006), and Monaco and Sabarwal (2016), we obtain
as our rst main necessary condition that the game must exhibit pairwise strategic substitutes
or complements at any interior regular equilibrium. The strict improvement cycle, provided it
can be constructed, may then run either clockwise or counterclockwise around the equilibrium,
depending on whether the horizontal (vertical) players local best-response function is strictly
increasing (strictly declining) or strictly declining (strictly increasing). As an illustration of its
usefulness, it will be shown that the criterion is tight in a class of probabilistic all-pay contests.
The criterion is then sharpened by considering strict improvement cycles that involve more
than two players. In the abstract, the existence of a particular strict improvement cycle is
shown to correspond to the semipositivity (Fiedler and Pták, 1966; Johnson et al., 1994) of a
matrix that is constructed from the Jacobian by replacing all diagonal entries by zero and by
multiplying all entries above the diagonal with negative one.8 Exploiting the specic structure
of the problem at hand, the semipositivity condition is then reformulated in more explicit
6The assumption that cross-derivatives do not vanish is indeed needed. To see this, consider the two-player or-
dinal potential game with payo¤s u1(x1; x2) =  (x1+x2)2 and u2(x1; x2) =  (x1+x2)6. Then, at any Cournot-
Nash equilibrium xN , the cross-derivatives are given by @
2u1(x

N )=@x2@x1 =  2 and @2u2(xN )=@x1@x2 = 0, in
conict with relationship (2).
7We call an interior Nash equilibrium regular if the local second-order conditions hold strictly at the equi-
librium point. In a neighborhood of a regular Nash equilibrium, one may dene local best-response functions,
which allows a more intuitive discussion of some of the ndings of this paper. Apart from the expositional
simplication, however, the regularity assumption is not crucial for the analysis.
8Semipositivity generalizes the concept of a P-matrix (Gale and Nikaidô, 1965). The relevant elements of
the theory of semipositive matrices will be reviewed in the next section.
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terms, such as the invertibility of the modied Jacobian and polynomial constraints on the
slopes of players local best-response functions. Moreover, useful additional conditions are
derived by either renaming players, or by ipping around individual strategy spaces (Vives,
1990; Amir, 1996). In particular, this leads to our second main condition in the case of one-
dimensional strategy spaces, viz. a set of equality constraints that must be satised by the slopes
of players local best-response functions (or alternatively, by the cross-derivatives of players
payo¤ functions) at any interior regular equilibrium of any generalized ordinal potential game
with at least three players. The two main conditions are then combined and rephrased into the
simple cross-derivative condition stated above.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries. The
rst main necessary condition is derived in Section 3. Section 4 deals with the general geometry
of strict improvement cycles involving more than two players. Section 5 discusses the second
main necessary condition. Specic classes of games are considered in Section 6. Section 7
discusses extensions. Section 8 concludes. All proofs have been relegated to an Appendix.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Games with continuous strategy spaces
A game   is dened by a set of players N = f1; :::; ng, a strategy space Xi for each i 2 N , and
a payo¤ function ui : XN  X1  :::  Xn ! R for each i 2 N . The game   will be called
smooth (e.g., Vives, 1999) if Xi is a subset of some Euclidean space and ui is twice continuously
di¤erentiable in the interior of XN , for any i 2 N . For expositional simplicity, the analysis will
subsequently focus on the case in which Xi  R for all i 2 N .9 Clearly, under this condition,
marginal payo¤s i  @ui=@xi are well-dened in the interior of XN for all i 2 N .
By a (Cournot-Nash) equilibrium of a game  , we mean a strategy prole xN  (x1; :::; xn) 2
XN such that ui(xi ; x

 i)  ui(xi; x i) for any i 2 N and for any xi 2 Xi, where x i =
(x1; :::; x

i 1; x

i+1; :::; x

n) is the prole comprised of the strategies chosen by the opponents of
player i, so that x i 2 X i  X1 :::Xi 1Xi+1 :::Xn. An equilibrium xN of a smooth
game   will be called interior if xi is an interior point of Xi for all i 2 N . At an interior equi-
9The case of multi-dimensional strategy spaces will be dealt with in Section 7.
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librium xN , the rst-order necessary condition associated with player is optimization problem
implies
i(x

i ; x

 i) =
@ui(x

i ; x

 i)
@xi
= 0 (i 2 N). (3)
An equilibrium xN will be called regular if, in addition,
@i(x

i ; x

 i)
@xi
=
@2ui(x

i ; x

 i)
@x2i
< 0 (i 2 N): (4)
Consider an interior regular equilibrium xN . Then, as a direct consequence of the implicit
function theorem, the equation i(xi; x i) = 0 denes a continuously di¤erentiable function
i  i(x i)  i(x i;xN) that maps any vector x i from a small open neighborhood U  X i
of x i to a strategy i(x i) 2 Xi such that i(i(x i); x i) = 0. We will refer to i(;xN) as
player is local best-response function around xN .
10 For any other player j 6= i, we will refer to
ij  ij(xN) =
@i(x

 i)
@xj
=  @i(x

N)=@xj
@i(xN)=@xi
=  @
2ui(x

N)=@xj@xi
@2ui(xN)=@x
2
i
(5)
as the slope of player is local best-response function with respect to player j.
2.2 Potentials and potential games
The following well-known denitions do not require di¤erentiability.11 A game   is an exact
potential game if there exists a function P : XN ! R, referred to as an exact potential of  ,
such that
ui(xi; x i)  ui(bxi; x i) = P (xi; x i)  P (bxi; x i) (6)
for any i 2 N , xi 2 Xi, bxi 2 Xi, and x i 2 X i. A game   is called a weighted potential game
if there exist positive factors w1 > 0; :::; wn > 0 as well as a function P : XN ! R, referred to
as a weighted potential of  , such that
ui(xi; x i)  ui(bxi; x i) = wi(P (xi; x i)  P (bxi; x i)) (7)
10This function may actually correspond to player is global best-response function (e.g., if ui(xi; x i) is
strictly quasiconcave in xi). However, this is not assumed.
11In fact, as shown by Voorneveld (1997) in response to a question raised by Peleg et al. (1996), an ordinal
potential game with continuous payo¤ functions need not possess a continuous ordinal potential function. How-
ever, this does not constitute a problem for the present analysis because the necessary conditions derived below
do not impose any continuity assumption on the generalized ordinal potential.
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for any i 2 N , xi 2 Xi, bxi 2 Xi, and x i 2 X i. Next,   is an ordinal potential game if
condition (6) in the denition of an exact potential game is replaced by
ui(xi; x i) > ui(bxi; x i) if and only if P (xi; x i) > P (bxi; x i). (8)
Finally,   is a generalized ordinal potential game if (6) is replaced by the even weaker condition
ui(xi; x i) > ui(bxi; x i) implies P (xi; x i) > P (bxi; x i). (9)
In the latter two cases, the function P is called an ordinal potential or generalized ordinal
potential, respectively, of the game  . Any exact potential is a weighted potential, any weighted
potential is an ordinal potential, and any ordinal potential is a generalized ordinal potential.
However, a generalized ordinal potential game need not, in general, be an ordinal potential
game, an ordinal potential game need not, in general, be a weighted potential game, and a
weighted potential game need not, in general, be an exact potential game.
Smooth exact potential games with intervals as strategy spaces may be conveniently char-
acterized in terms of the cross derivatives of playerspayo¤ functions.
Lemma 1 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996a). Consider a smooth game   in which strategy
spaces are intervals. Then   is an exact potential game if and only if
@2ui(xN)
@xj@xi
=
@2uj(xN)
@xi@xj
(i; j 2 N; j 6= i;xN 2 XN). (10)
The extension of Lemma 1 to weighted potential games is immediate. However, as discussed in
the Introduction, an analogous characterization for ordinal games, specically geared toward
the class of games with continuous strategy spaces, has apparently not been known so far.
A general necessary condition may be formulated in terms of the following concept. A strict
improvement cycle for a game   (of length L) is a nite sequence of strategy proles
:::! x0N ! x1N ! :::! xL 1N ! ::: (11)
in XN with the property that, for any l = 0; :::; L  1, there is a player i  (l) 2 N such that
xl+1 i = x
l
 i and ui(x
l+1
i ; x
l
 i) > ui(x
l
i; x
l
 i), where x
L
N should be read as x
0
N .
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We then have the following useful result.
Lemma 2 (Voorneveld, 1997). A generalized ordinal game does not admit any strict im-
provement cycle.12
2.3 Strategic substitutes and complements
Let xN be an interior strategy prole (e.g., an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium) in a smooth
game  . Then,   will be said to exhibit strategic complements (strategic substitutes) at xN if
@ui(xN)=@xj@xi  0 ( 0) for any two players i and j with j 6= i. Fix two players i and j with
j 6= i. We will say that   exhibits strategic complements (strategic substitutes) between i and j
at xN if @ui(xN)=@xj@xi  0 ( 0) and @uj(xN)=@xi@xj  0 ( 0). Finally, we will say that  
exhibits pairwise strategic complements or substitutes at xN if   exhibits, for any two players i
and j with j 6= i, either strategic complements between i and j at xN or strategic substitutes
between i and j at xN .
2.4 Semipositivity
Consider a vector N = (1; :::; n)T 2 Rn, where the superscript T indicates transposition, as
usual. We will write N > 0 (N  0) if all entries of N are positive (nonnegative), i.e., if
i > 0 (i  0) for all i = 1; :::; n. The following denition goes back at least to Fiedler and
Pták (1966).
Denition 1. A square matrix A 2 Rnn is called semipositive if there exists a vector N  0
such that AN > 0.
In the denition, we may obviously replace the weak inequality by a strict one, using a simple
perturbation argument. Thus, semipositivity amounts to the condition that (the interior of)
the convex cone generated by the columns of A intersects the positive orthant Rn++ = fzN 2
Rn : zN > 0g. Along these lines, semipositivity may be seen to correspond to a straightforward
feasibility condition in linear programming.
12For games in which strategy spaces can be totally ordered, local potentials (Morris, 1999; Frankel et al.,
2003; Morris and Ui, 2005; Okada and Tercieux, 2012) generalize exact potentials by requiring an inequality
condition that relaxes equation (7) in several ways. Since Lemma 2 does not apply, this extension lies outside
of our present focus. However, a characterization of local potential maximizers in smooth games can be found
in Morris (1999, p. 28).
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Call a square matrix A 2 Rnn inverse nonnegative if its matrix inverse A 1 exists and all
entries of A 1 are nonnegative. The following lemma provides a very useful recursive charac-
terization of semipositivity.
Lemma 3 (Johnson et al., 1994). A square matrix A 2 Rnn is semipositive if and only if
at least one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) A is inverse nonnegative;
(ii) there exists m 2 f1; :::; n  1g and a submatrix bA 2 Rnm obtained from A via deletion of
n m columns, such that all mm submatrices of bA are semipositive.
3. The rst necessary condition
3.1 Statement of the result
In this section, we derive the following simple yet apparently not widely known condition that is
necessary for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a game with continuous strategy
spaces.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the smooth game   admits a generalized ordinal potential. Then,
at any regular interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium xN , necessarily
ij(x

N )  ji(x N )  0 (12)
for any two players i 2 N and j 2 N with i 6= j.
Thus, any generalized ordinal potential game with continuous strategy spaces necessarily ex-
hibits pairwise strategic substitutes or complements at any interior regular equilibrium.
It is important to note that the respective slopes of the local best-response functions are
required to satisfy the inequality only at the prole xN itself, rather than, say, in an open
neighborhood of the equilibrium. This is not a weakness of our result but ultimately owed to
the exibility of the ordinal concept. In fact, as may be seen from the illustration given at the
end of this section, there are examples of ordinal potential games (viz. symmetric contests)
for which the mutual cross-derivatives @2ui(xN)=@xj@xi and @2uj(xN)=@xi@xj have di¤erent
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signs almost everywhere on the set of strategy proles (viz. o¤ the hyperplane dened through
xi = xj), even though condition (12) is certainly satised at the unique equilibrium.
It is similarly important to note that, in games with more than two players, condition (12)
requires only pairwise strategic complements or substitutes. Therefore, unless the game is sum-
aggregative (see Section 6 for a denition), the conclusion of Proposition 1 is less stringent than
the property that the game exhibits either strategic complements or strategic substitutes at any
interior regular equilibrium. Again, this should not come as a surprise because, e.g., ipping
around the strategy space of one of three players, say, may certainly destroy the property of
strategic complements or strategic substitutes, but does not change the property of being a
generalized ordinal game.
The conclusion of Proposition 1 is quite immediate when   actually admits an exact (or even
weighted) potential. Indeed, in this case, Lemma 1 implies that @2ui=@xj@xi = @2uj=@xi@xj
holds in the interior of XN . Therefore, at any regular interior equilibrium xN ,
ij(x

N )  ji(x N ) =

 @
2ui(x

N)=@xj@xi
@2ui(xN)=@x
2
i



 @
2uj(x

N)=@xi@xj
@2uj(xN)=@x
2
j

(13)
=
(@2ui(x

N)=@xj@xi)
2
(@2ui(xN)=@x
2
i ) 
 
@2uj(xN)=@x
2
j
  0, (14)
consistent with Proposition 1.
For a less obvious example, consider the interesting class of multiplicatively separable ag-
gregative games for which an ordinal potential has been constructed explicitly (Kukushkin,
1994; Nocke and Schutz, 2016). Thus, assume that payo¤s admit the representation ui(xN) =
xi  (xN) for all i 2 N , where  : XN ! R is an arbitrary twice continuously di¤erentiable
function that does not depend on the player i. Then, at any interior regular equilibrium xN ,
player js optimality condition implies
xj 
@(xN)
@xj
+ (xN) = 0, (15)
9
so that
xj  ij(xN) = xj 

 @
2ui(x

N)=@xj@xi
@2ui(xN)=@x
2
i

(16)
= xj 

 x

i  (@2(xN)=@xj@xi) + (@(xN)=@xj)
@2ui(xN)=@x
2
i

(17)
=  x

i  xj  (@2(xN)=@xj@xi)  (xN)
@2ui(xN)=@x
2
i
. (18)
Thus, noting the symmetry of the numerator in (18) with respect to i and j, we arrive at
ij(x

N) ji(xN)  0, consistent with Proposition 1.
However, if inequality (12) fails to hold for any two players at any regular interior equilib-
rium, then there cannot exist a generalized ordinal potential for  . In particular, a smooth
game with an interior regular equilibrium that exhibits, in the strategic interaction between
two players, an increasing reaction curve for one player and a decreasing reaction curve for
the other player is never a generalized ordinal potential game. A classic example is the mixed
oligopoly model by Singh and Vives (1984), in which one rm chooses a price, and the other
rm chooses a quantity. Another famous example is quantity competition between a dominant
rm and several fringe rms (Bulow et al., 1985). Many further examples, taken from diverse
areas such as law enforcement, business strategy, and citizen protests, for instance, can be found
in Tombak (2006) and Monaco and Sabarwal (2016).
3.2 Outline of proof
To understand why Proposition 1 holds true, consider Figure 1. Here, keeping the strategy pro-
le x i;j = (x

1; :::; x

i 1; x

i+1; :::; x

j 1; x

j+1; :::; x

n) xed, player is local best-response function
i = i(xj; x

 i;j) around x

N is strictly increasing in player js strategy xj, and player js local
best-response function j = j(xi; x i;j) around x

N is strictly decreasing in player is strategy
xi. Therefore, ij(xN)  ji(xN) < 0, and the necessary condition fails. And indeed, for " > 0
small enough, the nite sequence starting at the upper left corner and running clockwise around
the square,
:::! (xi   "; xj + "; x i;j)! (xi + "; xj + "; x i;j)! (19)
! (xi + "; xj   "; x i;j)! (xi   "; xj   "; x i;j)! :::,
10
constitutes a strict improvement cycle, as will be explained now. To start with, consider the
strategy change corresponding to the upper side of the square. Then, with " small, player is
payo¤ is rst increasing (over a longer section of the side) and then decreasing (over a shorter
section of the side).
Figure 1. Constructing a strict improvement cycle involving two players.
The point to note is now that, as a consequence of smoothness of payo¤s at the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, player is payo¤ function along the upper side of the square may be approximated
arbitrarily well by a parabola opening downwards, provided the square is small enough. As
the parabola is symmetric around its peak, the payo¤ di¤erence for player i, when switching
from strategy xi   " to xi + ", will be overall positive.13 Similar considerations apply to the
remaining three sides of the square. In fact, at the bottom side, there is no trade-o¤ because
player is marginal payo¤ is always negative there. Thus, in sum, one may construct a strict
improvement cycle that leads around the equilibrium. As seen in the previous section, however,
this is incompatible with the existence of a generalized ordinal potential.
3.3 Discussion
Proposition 1 may be further strengthened by focusing on the conditions that are actually used
in the proof. For example, the interiority assumption in Proposition 1 can be easily relaxed.
13There is a minor technical subtlety here in so far that the payo¤ di¤erence approaches zero as " goes to
zero. However, as shown in the Appendix with the help of a careful limit consideration, the payo¤ di¤erence
approaches zero from above since the corresponding cross-derivative is positive. This turns out to be su¢ cient
to settle the trade-o¤ for a su¢ ciently small but still positive ".
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What matters is that those players that are involved in the strict improvement cycle use an
interior strategy. Second, players that are not involved in the strict improvement circle may
use any strategy, even a suboptimal one.14 Further, the regularity assumption may be dropped
entirely provided that the conditions on the slopes introduced above and later in the paper are
replaced by the corresponding conditions on the cross-derivatives of playerspayo¤ functions.
For instance, in a two-player game, the necessary condition that 12(xN)  21(xN)  0 holds
at any regular interior equilibrium xN may be replaced by the somewhat more stringent, but
also maybe less vivid condition that (@2u1(xN)=@x2@x1)  (@2u2(xN)=@x1@x2)  0 holds at
any interior (i.e., not necessarily regular) equilibrium xN . Thus, the regularity assumption is
purely expositional.15 Then, the restriction to one-dimensional strategy spaces can be easily
relaxed, essentially because a nite sequence that is a strict improvement cycle remains a
strict improvement cycle when players are granted more strategic exibility. In fact, as will
be explained in Section 7, the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a smooth game
with multi-dimensional strategy spaces leads to implications that are much stronger than those
discussed so far (because there is more freedom for constructing strict improvement cycles in
higher dimensions). Next, the criterion applies more generally to any strategy prole at which
the rst-order conditions for all players are satised. Thus, rather than a global maximum, the
individual players problem may have a local maximum, local minimum, or inection point at
xN . Finally, the game   actually need not be smooth. It su¢ ces that the payo¤ functions of the
involved players are twice continuously di¤erentiable at the critical point under consideration.
However, no further strengthening of the results is possible from considering strategy proles
that are not local equilibria between at least two players. The reason is that, if at most one
players marginal condition holds at some xN , then there are no strict improvement cycles locally
at xN . To the contrary, it is then always feasible to construct locally an ordinal potential by
14These two generalizations will be illustrated below.
15However, the use of slopes rather than cross-derivatives is suggested also by the analysis of su¢ cient con-
ditions, which is not part of the present paper, though.
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exploiting the strict monotonicity of n   1 payo¤ functions.16 Relatedly, the consideration of
more complicated paths (in which players may move more than twice), does not lead to more
stringent conditions than those reported in the present paper. Indeed, while it may indeed be
easier to achieve a strict gain in payo¤ on a single non-centered path segment, shrinking the
path down to innitesimal size necessarily leads to a system of linear inequalities on second-
order derivatives only (cf. also the proof of Lemma 4 given in the Appendix). However, as will
be discussed later in the analysis, a simple search model actually covers all possible (nonzero)
slope combinations consistent with the necessary conditions. Along these lines, the conditions
identied in the present paper will be seen to be actually equivalent to the absence of any local
strict improvement cycle (dened by the requirement that it remains a strict improvement cycle
even after being shrunk by any factor " 2 (0; 1) via a pantograph xed at xN).17
3.4 An illustration
In the n-player lottery contest with valuations V1 > 0; :::; Vn > 0, player is payo¤ is given by
ui(x1; :::; xn) =
xi
x1 + :::+ xn
Vi   xi, (21)
where we assume that X1 = ::: = Xn = [0;1).18 It follows from a general result of Szidarovszky
and Okuguchi (1997) that this game has a unique (yet not necessarily interior) equilibrium
xN = (x

1; :::; x

n).
Rather than applying our criterion to the n-player equilibrium, we will consider an equilib-
rium in the two-player game between arbitrary players i 2 N and j 2 N with j 6= i, assuming
that all remaining players remain passive. This actually strengthens our criterion.19 So consider
16E.g., in the two-player case, if @u1(xN )=@x1 = 0 < @u2(x

N )=@x2, then
P (xN ) = u1(xN ) + x2 maxf2 j@u1(xN )=@x2j ; 1g (20)
is an ordinal potential in a small neighborhood of xN . Similar constructions can be used to cover the cases
where either (i) there are more than two players, or (ii) the marginal payo¤s of all players are non-zero at xN .
17Strict improvement cycles that are not local in this sense are discussed in the extensions section.
18If x1 + ::::+ xn = 0, then we assume ui = 1n .
19E.g., in a three-player contest with almost identical heterogeneous valuations, the respective slopes of the
local best-response functions at the unique interior equilibrium are all negative. Thus, in that case, a direct
application of Proposition 1 would not yield any valuable conclusions.
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a prole x#N = (x
#
i ; x
#
j ; x
#
 i;j) 2 XN such that the following conditions hold:
ui(x
#
i ; x
#
j ; x
#
 i;j)  ui(xi; x#j ; x# i;j) (xi 2 Xi), (22)
uj(x
#
j ; x
#
i ; x
#
 i;j)  uj(xj; x#i ; x# i;j) (xj 2 Xi), (23)
x# i;j = (0; :::; 0) 2 Rn 2. (24)
In the bilateral game between players i and j, equilibrium e¤orts are given by the well-known
expressions (cf. Konrad, 2009)
x#i =
V 2i Vj
(Vi + Vj)2
and x#j =
ViV
2
j
(Vi + Vj)2
. (25)
From
@2ui(x
#
N)
@x2i
=   2x
#
j Vi
(x#i + x
#
j )
3
< 0, (26)
and an analogous inequality for player j, we see that the equilibrium is regular. Moreover, the
slope of player is local best-response function is given by
ij(x
#
N) =  
@2ui(x
#
N)
@xj@xi

 
@2ui(x
#
N)
@x2i
! 1
=
x#i   x#j
2x#j
=
Vi   Vj
2Vj
. (27)
An analogous expression may be derived for player j. We therefore see that the necessary
condition ij(x
#
N)  ji(x#N)  0 holds if and only if
 (Vi   Vj)
2
4ViVj
 0, (28)
or equivalently, if and only if Vi = Vj. Thus, if valuations are strictly heterogeneous in the sense
that at least two valuations di¤er, then the n-player contest introduced above does not allow a
generalized ordinal potential.20
On the other hand, the lottery contest with homogenous valuations V  V1 = ::: = Vn
belongs to the beforementioned class of multiplicatively separable aggregative ordinal potential
games. Specically, the function
P (xN) = x1  :::  xn 

V
x1 + :::+ xn
  1

(xN > 0) (29)
20As will becomes clear later, the same conclusion holds under the much more exible assumptions of Dixit
(1987).
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is an ordinal potential for the lottery contest in the interior of the strategy space. In that sense,
our criterion is not only necessary but also su¢ cient in the considered class of contests.
4. Strict improvement cycles involving more than two players21
4.1 The role of semipositivity
In this section, we will discuss the geometry of strict improvement cycles that involve more
than two players.
To x ideas, the initial focus will be on a particular path in which players 1 through n
consecutively raise their respective strategies, and subsequently lower their strategies, following
the same order. Figure 2 illustrates a path of this kind for the case of three players. In contrast
to the case of cycles that involve two players only, it turns out that more stringent necessary
conditions are obtained when allowing for a rectangular-shaped box with edges that are not
necessarily of equal length.
Figure 2. Constructing a circular improvement path involving three players.
An analysis of the conditions necessary and su¢ cient for the described path to constitute a
strict improvement cycle leads to the following observation.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the smooth game   admits a generalized ordinal potential. Then, at
21This section is more technical than the rest of the paper and could be skipped in a rst reading.
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any regular interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium xN , the matrix of signed slopes
J  J(xN) =
0BBB@
0  12(xN)     1n(xN)
21(x

N) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .  n 1n(xN)
n1(x

N)    nn 1(xN) 0
1CCCA (30)
cannot be semipositive.
Thus, by logical contraposition, if the matrix J dened through (30) happens to be semipositive
at some regular interior equilibrium, then   does not admit a generalized ordinal potential.
In the sequel, we will take two more steps so as to develop Lemma 4 into our most general
result for the case of one-dimensional strategy spaces. First, note that the conclusion of Lemma
4, i.e., that J is not semipositive, may certainly be replaced by the less stringent conclusion
that J is not inverse nonnegative. As a matter of fact, this simplication will not weaken our
criterion at all, essentially because case (ii) of Lemma 3 corresponds to a situation in which one
may construct a strict improvement cycle with less than n players involved.
4.2 Permutations of the player set and ipped strategy spaces
Second, recall that Lemma 4 looks at one particular path only. Alternative paths, corresponding
to additional necessary conditions, may be constructed, e.g., by either (i) changing the order
in which players change their respective strategies, or by (ii) ipping around the natural order
of individual strategy spaces. While the rst concept is rather specic to the problem at hand,
the second concept (i.e., ipping around the natural order of an individual strategy space) is
familiar from the theory of the oligopoly, where it has been used, in particular, to convert a
two-player Cournot game with strategic substitutes into a supermodular game (Vives, 1990;
Amir, 1996).
Formally, let  : N ! N be an arbitrary bijection of the set of players. Then the natural
ordering 1; 2; :::; n in which the set N is run through twice in the construction of the strict
improvement cycle is permuted such that the strategy change of player i takes place at position
(i) rather than at position i. In other words, when  1 denotes the inverse of , player  1(1)
moves rst, and player  1(n) last. Below,  = id will refer to the identity mapping on N , and
 = (i1i2:::im) to the round-robin permutation that maps i1 to i2, i2 to i3, ..., im 1 to im, and im
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back to i1, leaving all remaining players unchanged. Further, denote by F  N the arbitrary
subset of players for which the strategy space is ipped around.
It turns out that both of these operations, including combinations thereof, may be conve-
niently implemented by a set of pairwise sign changes applied to the slopes of players local
best-response functions. More precisely, the matrix J introduced in the statement of Lemma 4
may be replaced, without a¤ecting the validity of the lemma, by any matrix
J (;F )  J (;F )(xN) =
0BBBB@
0  (;F )12 (xN)     (;F )1n (xN)

(;F )
21 (x

N) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .  (;F )n 1n(xN)

(;F )
n1 (x

N)    (;F )nn 1(xN) 0
1CCCCA , (31)
where the entries o¤ the diagonal are given by the formula22

(;F )
ij (x

N) = ( 1)Ifi2Fg+Ifj2Fg 
sgn((j)  (i))
sgn(j   i)  ij(x

N) (i; j 2 N; j 6= i). (32)
From equation (32), it is easy to see that ipping around all of the playersindividual strategy
spaces does not lead to any new condition, i.e., J (id;N) = J . Moreover, a circular shift of the
players forward by one position is equivalent to ipping around player ns strategy space only,
i.e., J ((12:::n);?) = J (id;fng). Taking account of such redundancies, however, a total of (n 1)!2n 1
independent conditions remain. Some of these will prove useful below.
4.3 A more general result
Recall that a principal submatrix of a square matrix A 2 Rnn is a submatrix eA 2 Rmm, for
some m 2 f1; :::; ng, that is obtained from A by deleting n m pairs of corresponding rows and
columns. In particular, A is a principal submatrix of itself. Summarizing the discussion so far,
we arrive at the following extension of Proposition 1.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the smooth game   admits a generalized ordinal potential. Then, at
any regular interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium xN , the matrix J = J(x

N) dened through (30)
does not possess an inverse nonnegative principal submatrix. Moreover, the same is true if J is
replaced by any matrix J (;F ) = J (;F )(xN) where players have been renamed using an arbitrary
22Here and elsewhere in the paper, sgn denotes the sign function, satisfying sgn(d) = +1 if d > 0, sgn(d) = 0
if d = 0, and sgn(d) =  1 if d < 0. Moreover, I denotes the indicator function, satisfying Ifi2Fg = 1 if i 2 F
and Ifi2Fg = 0 otherwise (similarly for Ifj2Fg).
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bijection  : N ! N , and where an arbitrary subset F  N of individual strategy spaces have
been ipped around.
Illustrations of how Lemma 5 sharpens the conclusion of Proposition 1 will be given below. The
following example shows, however, that the conclusion of Lemma 5 boils down to the conclusion
of Proposition 1 in the case of two players (i.e., the earlier restriction to strict improvement
cycles running over the edges of a square was indeed innocuous).
Example 1. It is obvious that the two one-dimensional principal submatrices of
J =

0  12(xN)
21(x

N) 0

(33)
are not inverse nonnegative. The condition that J itself is inverse nonnegative is that J is
nonsingular, with all entries of the inverse matrix being nonnegative. Because of
J 1 =
1
12(xN)21(x

N)

0 12(x

N)
 21(xN) 0

, (34)
this means 12(xN)21(x

N) < 0 and 21(x

N) > 0 > 12(x

N).
23 By ipping around the strategy
space of exactly one of the two players (i.e., by letting F = f1g or F = f2g, and  = id),
or alternatively by changing the order of moves (i.e., F = ? and  = (12)), one may assure
oneself that the sign condition on the individual slopes may be dropped without loss. Thus, we
return to the criterion captured by Proposition 1, viz. that the inequality 12(xN)21(x

N) < 0
is incompatible with the existence of a generalized ordinal potential for  .
5. The second necessary condition
5.1 Statement of the result
While Lemma 5 is quite general, it is also desirable to know less stringent conditions that
can be applied more readily to specic games. In this section, we therefore derive a second
set of conditions that are necessary for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential in a
given game with continuous strategy spaces. In contrast to the pairwise strategic substitutes or
23Indeed, suppose that J is inverse nonnegative with 12(xN )21(x

N ) > 0. Then, since all entries of J
 1
must be nonnegative, 12(xN )  0 and 21(xN )  0, so that 12(xN )21(xN )  0, which is impossible.
18
complements condition appearing in Proposition 1, the conditions introduced in the following
result impose restrictions on the slopes of local best-response functions (or, more generally,
cross-derivatives) of at least three players.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the smooth game   with more than two players admits a gener-
alized ordinal potential. Then, at any regular interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium xN , and for
any set fi1; i2; i3g  N of pairwise di¤erent players,
i1i2(x

N)  i2i3(xN)  i3i1(xN) = i2i1(xN)  i3i2(xN)  i1i3(xN). (35)
Moreover, for any set of pairwise distinct players fi1; ::::; img  N with m  4,
i1i2(x

N)  i2i3(xN)  :::  im 1im(xN)  imi1(xN) (36)
= i2i1(x

N)  i3i2(xN)  :::  imim 1(xN)  i1im(xN),
provided that i1i3(x

N) 6= 0; :::; i1im 1(xN) 6= 0 and i3i1(xN) 6= 0; :::; im 1i1(xN) 6= 0:
Thus, the product of pairwise slopes of the local best-response functions over an arbitrary cycle
of three players remains unchanged if the order in which the cycle is run through is reversed.
Moreover, this result extends to cycles of length four and beyond provided that a certain slopes
of playerslocal best-response functions are all nonzero.24
For exact potential games, the conclusion of Proposition 2 may be checked directly. For
instance, for an exact potential game with n = 3 players, Lemma 1 implies
12(x

N)  23(xN)  31(xN)
=
@2u1(x

N)=@x2@x1
@2u1(xN)=@x
2
1
 @
2u2(x

N)=@x3@x2
@2u2(xN)=@x
2
2
 @
2u3(x

N)=@x1@x3
@2u3(xN)=@x
2
3
(37)
=
@2u2(x

N)=@x1@x2
@2u1(xN)=@x
2
1
 @
2u3(x

N)=@x2@x3
@2u2(xN)=@x
2
2
 @
2u1(x

N)=@x3@x1
@2u3(xN)=@x
2
3
(38)
= 21(x

N)  32(xN)  13(xN), (39)
as claimed. Obviously, this argument extends in a straightforward way to more than three
players and likewise to the case of weighted potential games.
24For ordinal potentials that are su¢ ciently well-behaved, as in the subsequently listed examples, the assump-
tion that certain slopes do not vanish is obsolete. In general, however, it seems that the assumption cannot be
easily dropped.
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For the class of ordinal potential games in which payo¤s are given by ui(xN) = xi  (xN),
it is again the symmetry relationship
xj 
@2ui(x

N)
@x2i
 ij(xN) = xi 
@2uj(x

N)
@x2j
 ji(xN) (i; j 2 N; j 6= i) (40)
derived in equations (16-18) that allows the same conclusion.
Proposition 2 shows that these properties hold, more generally, for any generalized ordinal
potential game. The result is actually somewhat unexpected, because the rather inexible
equality constraints (35-36) follow from a set of assumptions that are entirely of an ordinal
nature.
A way to reformulate and summarize the conclusions of Propositions 1 and 2, essentially
without losing any mileage,25 is the following, beforementioned result.
Corollary 1. Consider an interior regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium xN in a smooth game
  such that all slopes fij(xN) : i; j 2 N s.t. i 6= jg are nonzero. If   admits a generalized
ordinal potential, then there exist positive weights w1(xN) > 0; :::; wn(x

N) > 0 such that
ij(x

N)wi(x

N) = ji(x

N)wj(x

N) (i; j 2 N; j 6= i). (41)
Thus, as discussed in the Introduction, the existence of an ordinal potential implies a local
property that is reminiscent of the global condition for a weighted potential game.
5.2 Illustrations
We will illustrate Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 with the help of two additional examples. These
are a search model of the Diamond-type, which extends an example in Milgrom and Roberts
(1990), and a model of horizontally di¤erentiated price competition. The rst example will also
allow us to settle an earlier question regarding strict improvement cycles that do not simply
follow the edges of a rectangular box.
Consider rst the following search model. Each of n players i = 1; :::; n chooses a search
e¤ort xi  0 at costs Ci(xi), and receives a payo¤
ui(x1; :::; xn) =
P
j 6=iijxixj

+ bixi   Ci(xi), (42)
25That is, Corollary 1 implies both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 in the case of nonzero slopes.
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where ij 6= 0 measures player is expected benet (or damage) resulting from a random
encounter with player j, and bi 2 R is player is intrinsic marginal valuation of search e¤ort.
Note that it is not assumed here that the game is supermodular. We shall assume, however,
that the cost functions are quadratic for all players, i.e., that Ci(xi) = cix2i for some ci > 0.
Suppose that an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists. Then, by Corollary 1, the search
game admits a generalized ordinal potential only if there are factors w1 > 0; :::; wn > 0 such that
ijwi = jiwj for all i and j with j 6= i. However, that condition is equivalent to the existence
of a weighted potential. Hence, given that being a weighted potential game is more stringent
than being a generalized ordinal potential game, the condition of Corollary 1 is actually seen
to be tight also in this case.
Relatedly, returning to the discussion adjourned at the end of Section 3, for any given
interior strategy prole xN , and arbitrary nonzero slopes fij(xN) 6= 0 : j 6= ig, the prole
xN is easily seen to be a regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the search model for parameters
ij = ij(x

N), bi = x

i   j 6=iijxj , and ci = 12 . Therefore, the conditions on the slopes of the
local best-response functions obtained in Corollary 1 cannot be tightened any further in this
specic class of games. Since the consideration of local strict improvement cycles of arbitrary
shape can only lead to slope conditions that apply regardless of the specic game at hand, this
implies that the consideration of local strict improvement cycles of arbitrary shape in arbitrary
smooth games indeed does not lead to additional insights over those already obtained.26
Next, consider the following model of Bertrand-style competition between n rms i = 1; :::; n
with di¤erentiated products. Suppose that each rm i 2 N chooses a price xi (keeping the
notation for convenience), and subsequently sells a quantity
qi(xN) = Qi   sixi +
X
j 6=i
ijxj, (43)
where Qi > 0, si > 0, and ij 6= 0 are parameters. Firm is production cost is represented by a
convex and twice continuously di¤erentiable function i. Thus, rm is prot reads
ui(xN) = xiqi(xN)  i(qi(xN)). (44)
26In fact, it follows now from the proofs that, if a local strict improvement cycle of any shape and for any
number of players exists, then there will also be a strict improvement cycle that is rectangular-shaped and that
involves at most three players.
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The conditions for the existence of an exact potential may be derived in a straightforward way.
Specically, the cross-derivative of rm is prot with respect to rm j is given by
@2ui(xN)
@xj@xi
= ij(1 + si
00
i (qi(xN))). (45)
Hence, from Lemma 1, the price-setting game admits an exact potential if and only if
ij(1 + si
00
i ) = ji(1 + sj
00
j ) (i; j 2 N ; j 6= i). (46)
In particular, all cost functions need to be (at most) quadratic. Even though this is a classic
example, little was known about the possibility of a generalized ordinal potential. Suppose that
the price-setting game allows an interior equilibrium xN . Then, from Proposition 2, we obtain
a necessary condition that is less stringent than (46), viz. that
i1i2i2i3i3i1 = i2i1i3i2i1i3 (47)
holds for any set fi1; i2; i3g of pairwise di¤erent rms. Thus, if price externalities are generic (in
the sense that equation (47) fails to hold for some triplet fi1; i2; i3g of pairwise di¤erent rms,
then the price-setting game with more than two rms does not admit a generalized ordinal
potential. Clearly, the same conclusion may be drawn if any of the analogues of equation (47)
fails to hold for any m  4.
6. Some specic classes of games
The purpose of this section is it to characterize the restrictions that our necessary conditions
impose in three specic classes of games. By necessary conditions, we mean here throughout
the strongest-form necessary conditions summarized in Lemma 5.
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6.1 Sum-aggregative games
In a sum-aggregative game (e.g., Corchón, 1994), each player is payo¤ function may be written
as ui(xi; x i) = Ui(xi; x i) for some function Ui on Xi  R, where x i =
P
j 6=ixj. Examples
include Cournot games and contests (such as the one considered above). We claim that the
consideration of strict improvement cycles involving any number of players yields no conclusions
on top of what Proposition 1 would deliver. To see this, note that, at any prole xN from the
interior of XN , the payo¤ representation of the sum-aggregative game implies
@2ui(xN)
@xj@xi
=
@2ui(xN)
@xk@xi
(48)
for any set fi; j; kg of pairwise di¤erent players. Therefore, at any interior regular equilibrium
xN , the slopes of the local best-response functions satisfy ij(x

N)  i(xN) for any two players
i and j with j 6= i. Consequently, the matrix J = J(xN) dened through (30) attains the
particular form
J =
0BBBBB@
0  1(xN)  1(xN)     1(xN)
2(x

N) 0  2(xN)     2(xN)
3(x

N) 3(x

N) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .  n 1(xN)
n(x

N) n(x

N)    n(xN) 0
1CCCCCA : (49)
To see under what conditions this matrix is semipositive, it clearly su¢ ces to restrict attention
to the case where i(xN) 6= 0 for all i 2 N . Since we are interested in conclusions that go
beyond those of Proposition 1, we may even assume that i(xN)j(x

N) > 0 for any two players
i and j with j 6= i. But then, all slopes are nonzero and of the same sign, so that J may be
rescaled into a skew-symmetric matrix by multiplying it from the left with a positive diagonal
matrix. Thus, J cannot be semipositive.27 Moreover, the conclusion of skew-symmetry does
not change when we permute the player set or ip around individual strategy spaces.
The discussion may be summarized as follows.
Corollary 2. A smooth sum-aggregative game   satises the necessary conditions for the
27Indeed, a skew-symmetric matrix is never semipositive. To see this, suppose that A 2 Rnn is semipositive.
Then, there exists N 2 Rn with N > 0 such that AN > 0. Hence, if A is also skew-symmetric, AT =  A,
so that ATN =  AN < 0. However, by the Theorem of the Alternative (Johnson et al., 1994, Th. 2.9), this
is impossible.
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existence of a generalized ordinal potential if and only if   exhibits, at any interior regular
equilibrium, either strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
6.2 Symmetric games
A game   is symmetric if all players have the same strategy space X  X1 = ::: = XN , and if,
for any permutation  : N ! N of the player set, payo¤s satisfy
ui(x1; :::; xn) = u(i)(x(1); :::; x(n)) (i 2 N; (x1; :::; xn) 2 XN). (50)
Furthermore, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium xN = (x

1; :::; x

n) is symmetric if x

1 = ::: = x

N .
Smooth symmetric games admit at least one symmetric equilibrium under standard assumptions
(Moulin, 1986, p. 115).28 Therefore the following observation may be useful.
Corollary 3. In any smooth symmetric game  , the necessary conditions for the existence
of a generalized ordinal potential are automatically satised at any symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.
For instance, it is known that any symmetric game with one-dimensional strategy spaces and
best-response functions that have a slope globally strictly above negative one admits at most
one Cournot-Nash equilibrium (Vives, 1999). Since the equilibrium is necessarily symmetric in
that case, such games satisfy our necessary conditions as well.
6.3 Zero-sum games
As usual, we call a two-player game   zero-sum if u1(xN) + u2(xN) = 0 for all xN 2 XN . For
this case, Proposition 1 yields the following noteworthy implication.
Corollary 4. A smooth two-player zero-sum game   satises the necessary conditions for the
existence of a generalized ordinal potential if and only if 12(xN) = 21(x

N) = 0 at any interior
regular saddle point xN of  .
Thus, if players reaction curves always intersect at a right angle that is aligned with the
coordinate system (as it is the case in a symmetric two-player zero-sum game, for instance), then
28However, there are also large classes of economically relevant symmetric games that admit only asymmetric
pure-strategy Nash equilibria (cf. Amir et al., 2010).
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the necessary conditions for the existence of a generalized ordinal potential hold. Conversely,
no generalized ordinal potential is feasible in a two-player zero-sum game if the tangents to the
playersreaction curves are not parallel to the coordinate axes at any point of intersection.
Corollary 4 extends to two-player games that are strategically zero-sum in the sense of
Moulin and Vial (1978), i.e., to games such that u1(xN) + u2(xN) is additively separable in x1
and x2. In particular, this is an alternative way to look at the contest example discussed above.
7. Extensions
7.1 Multi-dimensional strategy spaces
Below, we will briey summarize the adaptions that need to be made to accommodate multi-
dimensional strategy spaces. In fact, as it turns out, the extension of the necessary conditions
is mainly a matter of notation.
In the case of one-dimensional strategy spaces, the most general condition for the existence
of a strict improvement cycle required the existence of a vector N = (1; :::; n)T 2 Rn with
N > 0 such that JN > 0, where J denotes as before the matrix of signed slopesintroduced
in Lemma 4. Taking account of the possibility of ipping around any subset of individual
strategy spaces, yet keeping the natural ordering of the players, this condition is equivalent
to the existence of a vector N = (1; :::; n)T 2 Rn (all components of which are necessarily
nonzero) such that
0BBB@
1 0    0
0 2
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0    0 n
1CCCA
0BBBBBBBBB@
0  @
2u1(x

N)
@x2@x1
    @
2u1(x

N)
@xn@x1
@2u2(x

N)
@x1@x2
0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .  @
2un 1(xN)
@xn@xn 1
@2un(x

N)
@x1@xn
   @
2un(x

N)
@xn 1@xn
0
1CCCCCCCCCA
0BBB@
1
2
...
n
1CCCA < 0.
(51)
The benet of this reformulation is that condition (51) easily extends to the case of multi-
dimensional strategy spaces. To see this, suppose that now Xi  Rdi for i = 1; :::; n, where di
denotes the dimension of player is strategy space. Thus, each player i 2 N chooses a vector
(x
(1)
i ; :::; x
(di)
i ) 2 Xi, such that her payo¤ function ui has a total of dimXN = d1 + ::: + dn
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arguments. Then, to obtain the multi-dimensional analogue of the semipositivity condition,
one replaces each scalar i (i.e., the length of the respective side of the rectangular box) by
a vector i = (
(1)
i ; :::; 
(d1)
i ) 2 Rdi (i.e., a direction of change for the unilateral change of
strategy by player i in the strict improvement cycle), and correspondingly, each cross derivative
(@2ui(x

N)=@xj@xi) by a matrix Hij 2 Rdidj collecting the cross-derivatives of player is payo¤
function ui with respect to any pair consisting of one of player is and one of player js choice
variables. The component i(@2ui(xN)=@xj@xi)j resulting from the left-hand side of (51) must
then be replaced by (i)THijj.
For example, in the case of n = 2 players with d1 = d2 = 2, the semipositivity condition
(allowing for ipped strategy spaces) must be replaced by the condition that there exist vectors
1 = (
(1)
1 ; 
(2)
1 )
T and 2 = (
(1)
2 ; 
(2)
2 )
T such that
(1)
TH122 > 0 and (2)TH211 < 0, (52)
where
Hij =
0BBB@
@2ui(x

N)
@x
(1)
j @x
(1)
i
@2ui(x

N)
@x
(2)
j @x
(1)
i
@2ui(x

N)
@x
(1)
j @x
(2)
i
@2ui(x

N)
@x
(2)
j @x
(2)
i
1CCCA (i 2 N = f1; 2g; i 6= j) (53)
denotes the beforementioned matrix of cross-derivatives. The corresponding conditions for
either more than two involved players or strategy spaces of dimension larger than two may now
be found by straightforward extension. Using this notation, the proof of Lemma 4 extends in
a straightforward way.
7.2 Non-local strict improvement cycles
The approach of this paper extends to non-local strict improvement cycles, where the role of the
interior equilibrium is taken over by a cyclic path along which the generalized ordinal potential
stays constant. We illustrate the basic idea with an example, featuring two players and one-
dimensional strategy spaces. Suppose that x N = (x
 
1 ; x
 
2 ) and x
+
N = (x
+
1 ; x
+
2 ) are two interior
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strategy proles such that
u1(x
 
1 ; x
+
2 ) = u1(x
+
1 ; x
+
2 ), (54)
u2(x
+
1 ; x
+
2 ) = u2(x
+
1 ; x
 
2 ), (55)
u1(x
+
1 ; x
 
2 ) = u1(x
 
1 ; x
 
2 ), (56)
u2(x
 
1 ; x
 
2 ) = u2(x
 
1 ; x
+
2 ). (57)
In other words, the nite sequence
:::! (x 1 ; x+2 )! (x+1 ; x+2 )! (x+1 ; x 2 )! (x 1 ; x 2 )! ::: (58)
is a cyclic path along which the player that changes her strategy keeps an unchanged payo¤.
Consider now a perturbation of the proles, say
ex N(") = (x 1 + " 1 ; x 2 + " 2 ), (59)
ex+N(") = (x+1 + "+1 ; x+2 + "+2 ), (60)
for " > 0 small, and for an arbitrary vector # = ( 1 ; 
+
1 ; 
 
2 ; 
+
2 )
T 2 R4. Then, for " su¢ ciently
small, the nite sequence
:::! (ex 1 ("); ex+2 ("))! (ex+1 ("); ex+2 ("))! (ex+1 ("); ex 2 ("))! (ex 1 ("); ex 2 ("))! ::: (61)
is a strict improvement cycle provided that the following conditions hold:
+1
@u1(x
+
1 ; x
+
2 )
@x1
+ +2
@u1(x
+
1 ; x
+
2 )
@x2
   1
@u1(x
 
1 ; x
+
2 )
@x1
  +2
@u1(x
 
1 ; x
+
2 )
@x2
> 0 (62)
+1
@u2(x
+
1 ; x
 
2 )
@x1
+  2
@u2(x
+
1 ; x
 
2 )
@x2
  +1
@u2(x
+
1 ; x
+
2 )
@x1
  +2
@u2(x
+
1 ; x
+
2 )
@x2
> 0 (63)
 1
@u1(x
 
1 ; x
 
2 )
@x1
+  2
@u1(x
 
1 ; x
 
2 )
@x2
  +1
@u1(x
+
1 ; x
 
2 )
@x1
   2
@u1(x
+
1 ; x
 
2 )
@x2
> 0 (64)
 1
@u2(x
 
1 ; x
+
2 )
@x1
+ +2
@u2(x
 
1 ; x
+
2 )
@x2
   1
@u2(x
 
1 ; x
 
2 )
@x1
   2
@u2(x
 
1 ; x
 
2 )
@x2
> 0 (65)
In particular, if   admits a generalized ordinal potential, then the matrix
r(x N ; x+N) (66)
=
0BBBB@
 @u1(x 1 ;x+2 )
@x1
@u1(x
+
1 ;x
+
2 )
@x1
0
@fu1(x+1 ;x+2 ) u1(x 1 ;x+2 )g
@x2
0
@fu2(x+1 ;x 2 ) u2(x+1 ;x+2 )g
@x1
@u2(x
+
1 ;x
 
2 )
@x2
 @u2(x+1 ;x+2 )
@x2
@u1(x
 
1 ;x
 
2 )
@x1
 @u1(x+1 ;x 2 )
@x1
@fu1(x 1 ;x 2 ) u1(x+1 ;x 2 )g
@x2
0
@fu2(x 1 ;x+2 ) u2(x 1 ;x 2 )g
@x1
0  @u2(x 1 ;x 2 )
@x2
@u2(x
 
1 ;x
+
2 )
@x2
1CCCCA
27
must not be semipositive. Moreover, an analogous conclusion is obtained for any matrix derived
from r(x N ; x+N) by multiplying an arbitrary subset of the column vectors with negative one.
Thus, an extension to non-local cycles is indeed feasible.29
8. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have identied tight conditions necessary for the existence of a generalized
ordinal potential in any given game with continuous strategy spaces and twice continuously
di¤erentiable payo¤ functions. Since every ordinal game is, in particular, a generalized ordinal
potential game, the same conditions are equally crucial for the existence of an ordinal potential.
In this sense, a (partial) di¤erentiable characterization of these important classes of games has
been accomplished.
We have used our criteria to prove the non-existence of generalized ordinal potentials in a
variety of classic games, including probabilistic all-pay contests with heterogeneous valuations,
mixed oligopoly, and quantity competition with a dominant rm. Parameter constraints have
been obtained for a search model and a di¤erentiated Bertrand game with more than two rms.
Besides illustrating the usefulness of the conditions, these applications allow to see some of the
economic implications of ordinal potential concepts.
Our results imply, in particular, that the class of concave games (Rosen, 1965) is not con-
tained in the class of generalized ordinal potential games.30 While both concepts impose related
restrictions on second-order derivatives, viz. negative quasideniteness of the Jacobian in the
case of concave games and not semipositivity of the sign-modied Jacobian in the case of gen-
eralized ordinal potential games, the relationship is actually rather loose. For instance, in a
smooth two-player game with payo¤functions that are strictly concave in own strategy, negative
29One might speculate whether the kernel of the matrix r(x N ; x+N ) contains information about the isoquants
of any ordinal potential. Numerical investigations suggest, however, that unless isoquants are elliptic, r(x N ; x+N )
will be invertible. Intuitively, this means that there typically does not exist a nearby constant-payo¤ cycleof
the same length.
30Conversely, however, it is well-known that any smooth game admitting a twice continuously di¤erentiable
exact potential function whose Hessian is globally negative denite is a concave game. See, e.g., Neyman (1997),
Ui (2008), and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009).
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quasideniteness of the Jacobian is tantamount to@2u1(xN)@x2@x1 + @
2u2(xN)
@x1@x2
  2
s@2u1(xN)@x21
  @2u2(xN)@x22
. (67)
Thus, mixed signs of mutual cross-derivatives at an interior equilibrium are feasible in a concave
game, yet as noted above, not in a generalized ordinal potential game.
Clearly, our ndings may also be conducive to the identication of new classes of ordinal
potential games. In particular, we have shown that necessary conditions in the strongest form
are satised by three important classes of games, which may be informally described as (i) sum-
aggregative games with either increasing or decreasing best-response functions, (ii) symmetric
games in which best-response functions have everywhere slopes strictly exceeding negative one,
and (iii) symmetric two-person zero-sum games. This allows for the theoretical possibility that
some of these games might indeed admit a generalized ordinal potential.31
A somewhat unexpected feature of the analysis is reected in the equality constraints that
apply to smooth generalized ordinal potential games with more than two players. After all, the
assumptions driving the equality constraints are of a purely ordinal nature, while the implica-
tions are nongeneric in nature. We have no simple intuition for this nding.
Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of our results. For the proofs of the known facts summarized
above as Lemmas 1 through 3, the reader is referred to Monderer and Shapley (1996a, Th. 4.5),
Voorneveld (1997, Lemma 2.1), and Johnson et al. (1994, Cor. 3.5 & Th. 4.3), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1. By contradiction. Suppose that, at some interior regular equilibrium
xN , and for some players i and j with j 6= i, we have ij(xN)ji(xN) < 0. By renaming players,
if necessary, we may assume that ji(xN) < 0 < ij(x

N). Thus, player is local best-response
31Preliminary research by the author on the construction of ordinal potentials in smooth games strongly
suggests that the necessary conditions identied in the present paper are indicative regarding su¢ ciency as well.
However, unfortunately, the matter of su¢ ciency is highly involved. For example, the pseudo- and best-reply
potentials ingeniously constructed in prior work (Huang, 2002; Dubey et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010) need not be
generalized ordinal potentials in general. Because of such di¢ culties, it has to remain feasible for the time being
that the restrictions implied by the existence of a generalized ordinal potential are even more restrictive than
the necessary conditions identied in the present analysis.
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function around xN is strictly increasing in xj, whereas player js local best-response function
around xN is strictly declining in xi (i.e., just as shown in Figure 1), with
@2ui(x

N)
@xj@xi
> 0 and
@2uj(x

N)
@xi@xj
< 0. (68)
It is claimed now that, for any su¢ ciently small " > 0, the payo¤ di¤erence corresponding to
the upper side of the square satises
+i (")  ui(xi + "; xj + "; x i;j)  ui(xi   "; xj + "; x i;j) > 0. (69)
To prove this, we determine the rst and second derivatives of the function +i ("), and evaluate
at " = 0. As for the rst derivative, one obtains
@+i (")
@"
=

@ui(x

i + "; x

j + "; x

 i;j)
@xi
+
@ui(x

i + "; x

j + "; x

 i;j)
@xj

 

 @ui(x

i   "; xj + "; x i;j)
@xi
+
@ui(x

i   "; xj + "; x i;j)
@xj

. (70)
Evaluating at " = 0, and subsequently exploiting the necessary rst-order condition for player
i at the interior equilibrium xN , we nd
@+i (0)
@"
= 2  @ui(x

N)
@xi
= 0. (71)
Next, consider the second derivative of +i (") at " = 0, i.e.,
@2+i (0)
@"2
=

@2ui(x

N)
@x2i
+
@2ui(x

N)
@xj@xi
+
@2ui(x

N)
@xi@xj
+
@2ui(x

N)
@x2j

(72)
 

@2ui(x

N)
@x2i
  @
2ui(x

N)
@xj@xi
  @
2ui(x

N)
@xi@xj
+
@2ui(x

N)
@x2j

= 2  @
2ui(x

N)
@xj@xi
+ 2  @
2ui(x

N)
@xi@xj
. (73)
Invoking Schwarzs theorem regarding the equality of cross-derivatives for twice continuously
di¤erentiable functions, and subsequently using (68), one nds
@2+i (0)
@"2
= 4  @
2ui(x

N)
@xj@xi
> 0. (74)
In sum, (71) and (74) imply that, indeed, +i (") > 0 for any su¢ ciently small " > 0. Analogous
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arguments can be used to deal with the other three sides of the square. Specically, one denes
+j (") = uj(x

j   "; xi + "; x i;j)  uj(xj + "; xi + "; x i;j), (75)
 i (") = ui(x

i   "; xj   "; x i;j)  ui(xi + "; xj   "; x i;j), (76)
 j (") = uj(x

j + "; x

i   "; x i;j)  uj(xj   "; xi   "; x i;j), (77)
and now readily veries that
@+j (0)
@"
= ( 2)  @uj(x

N)
@xj
= 0, (78)
@ i (0)
@"
= ( 2)  @ui(x

N)
@xi
= 0, (79)
@ j (0)
@"
= 2  @uj(x

N)
@xj
= 0, (80)
and that
@2+j (0)
@"2
= ( 4)  @
2uj(x

N)
@xi@xj
> 0, (81)
@2 i (0)
@"2
= 4  @
2ui(x

N)
@xj@xi
> 0, (82)
@2 j (0)
@"2
= ( 4)  @
2uj(x

N)
@xi@xj
> 0. (83)
It follows that +i (") > 0, 
+
j (") > 0, 
 
i (") > 0, and 
 
j (") > 0 all hold for " > 0 small
enough. But then, the nite sequence (19) is a strict improvement cycle, which is incompatible
with the existence of a generalized ordinal potential by Lemma 2. 
Proof of Lemma 4. A semipositive matrix remains semipositive after multiplication from the
left or right with any positive diagonal matrix (Johnson et al., 1994, p. 267). Therefore, the
semipositivity of J is equivalent to the semipositivity of the matrix
J =
0BBBBBBBBB@
0  @
2u1(x

N)
@x2@x1
    @
2u1(x

N)
@xn@x1
@2u2(x

N)
@x1@x2
0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .  @
2un 1(xN)
@xn@xn 1
@2un(x

N)
@x1@xn
   @
2un(x

N)
@xn 1@xn
0
1CCCCCCCCCA
, (84)
which is constructed from the Jacobian of   by replacing all diagonal entries by zero and by
multiplying all entries above the diagonal with negative one. Suppose now that J is semipositive,
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so that J is semipositive as well. Then, by denition, there exists a vector N = (1; :::; n)T 2 R
with N > 0 such that JN > 0. Consider now the nite sequence
:::! x(1;+)N (") = (x1 + 1"; x2   2"; x3   3"; :::; xn 1   n 1"; xn   n")!
! x(2;+)N (") = (x1 + 1"; x2 + 2"; x3   3"; :::; xn 1   n 1"; xn   n")!
...
! x(n;+)N (") = (x1 + 1"; x2 + 2"; x3 + 3"; :::; xn 1 + n 1"; xn + n")! (85)
! x(1; )N (") = (x1   1"; x2 + 2"; x3 + 3"; :::; xn 1 + n 1"; xn + n")!
! x(2; )N (") = (x1   1"; x2   2"; x3 + 3"; :::; xn 1 + n 1"; xn + n")!
...
! x(n; )N (") = (x1   1"; x2   2"; x3   3"; :::; xn 1   n 1"; xn   n")! :::,
where " > 0 is a small constant as before. Figure 2 illustrates this path for n = 3, where the
rectangular-shaped box has sides of respective length "i = i" for i = 1; 2; 3. It is claimed that,
for any " > 0 su¢ ciently small, the following four conditions hold:
(i) player 1s payo¤ at x(1;+)N (") is strictly higher than at x
(n; )
N (");
(ii) for i = 2; :::; n, player is payo¤ at x(i;+)N (") is strictly higher than at x
(i 1;+)
N (");
(iii) player 1s payo¤ at x(1; )N (") is strictly higher than at x
(n;+)
N (");
(iv) for i = 2; :::; n, player is payo¤ at x(i; )N (") is strictly higher than at x
(i 1; )
N (").
To establish (i), proceed precisely as in the proof of Proposition 1, and consider the rst two
derivatives of the payo¤ di¤erence
(1;+)(") = u1(x
(1;+)
N ("))  u1(x(n; )N (")) (86)
= u1(x

1 + 1"; x

2   2"; x3   3"; :::; xn 1   n 1"; xn   n") (87)
  u1(x1   1"; x2   2"; x3   3"; :::; xn 1   n 1"; xn   n")
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at " = 0. The rst derivative of (1;+)(") at " = 0 is given by
@(1;+)(0)
@"
=

1
@u1(x

N)
@x1
  2@u1(x

N)
@x2
  :::  n@u1(x

N)
@xn

(88)
 

 1@u1(x

N)
@x1
  2@u1(x

N)
@x2
  :::  n@u1(x

N)
@xn

= 21
@u1(x

N)
@x1
. (89)
Hence, from player 1s rst-order condition,
@(1;+)(0)
@"
= 0. (90)
Next, one considers the second derivative of (1;+)(") at " = 0, i.e.,
@2(1;+)(0)
@"2
=

(1)
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2u1(x

N)
@x21
  21@
2u1(x

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2u1(x

N)
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+ :::+ n2
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
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2u1(x

N)
@x1@xn
+ 2n
@2u1(x

N)
@x2@xn
+ :::+ (n)
2@
2u1(x

N)
@x2n

(91)
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
(1)
2@
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
N)
@x21
+ 21
@2u1(x

N)
@x2@x1
+ :::+ n1
@2u1(x

N)
@xn@x1
+ 12
@2u1(x

N)
@x1@x2
+ (22)
@2u1(x

N)
@x22
+ :::+ n2
@2u1(x

N)
@xn@x2
...
+ 1n
@2u1(x

N)
@x1@xn
+ 2n
@2u1(x

N)
@x2@xn
+ :::+ (n)
2@
2u1(x

N)
@x2n

.
Collecting terms, one obtains
@2(1;+)(0)
@"2
=  21

2
@2u1(x

N)
@x2@x1
+ 3
@2u1(x

N)
@x3@x1
+ :::+ n
@2u1(x

N)
@xn@x1

: (92)
Thus, using 1 > 0, and recalling that the signs in the rst of the n inequalities in the system
JN > 0 are all negative, one arrives at
@2(1;+)(0)
@"2
> 0. (93)
It follows that (1;+)(") > 0 for any " > 0 su¢ ciently small, which proves (i). To verify claims
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(ii) through (iv), dene payo¤ di¤erences
(i;+)(") = ui(x
(i;+)
N ("))  ui(x(i 1;+)N (")) (i = 2; :::; n), (94)
(1; )(") = u1(x
(1; )
N ("))  u1(x(n;+)N (")), (95)
(i; )(") = ui(x
(i; )
N ("))  ui(x(i 1;+)N (")) (i = 2; :::; n). (96)
Using the playersnecessary rst-order conditions, it is straightforward to validate that
@(i;+)(0)
@"
= 0 (i = 2; :::; n), (97)
@(1; )(0)
@"
= 0, (98)
@(i; )(0)
@"
= 0 (i = 2; :::; n). (99)
Moreover, for i = 2; :::; n, calculations analogous to (91) yield
@2(i;+)(0)
@"2
= 2i

1
@2ui(x

N)
@x1@xi
+ :::+ i 1
@2ui(x

N)
@xi 1@xi
(100)
 i+1@
2ui(x

N)
@xi+1@xi
  :::  n@
2ui(x

N)
@xn@xi

> 0, (101)
where the inequality corresponding to player is strategy change corresponds precisely to the
is inequality in the system JN > 0. Finally, one notes that, since d( ")2 = d"2, it follows
that
@2(i; )(0)
@"2
=
@2(i;+)(0)
@"2
(i = 1; :::; n). (102)
In sum, this clearly proves (ii) through (iv). Thus, there exists a strict improvement cycle in
 . Since this is impossible, the lemma follows. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Take a bijection  : N ! N and a subset F  N . Suppose that
players have been renamed corresponding to , so that  1(1) moves rst and  1(n) moves
last, and the strategy spaces of the players in F have been ipped around. Suppose rst that
F = ?. Then, if a strict improvement cycle corresponding to (; F ) can be constructed, Lemma
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4 implies that the matrix
J(xN)
=
0BBBB@
0   1(1) 1(2)(xN)      1(1) 1(n)(xN)
 1(2) 1(1)(x

N) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .   1(n 1) 1(n)(xN)
 1(n) 1(1)(x

N)    (;F ) 1(n) 1(n 1)(xN) 0
1CCCCA ,
(103)
is semipositive. Dene the nn permutation matrix  = fijg with entries ij = 1 if j = (i)
and ij = 0 if j 6= (i). Then it can be checked that32
J(xN)(
)T = J (;?)(xN). (108)
Since semipositivity of a matrix is not a¤ected by multiplication from the right or left with
a permutation matrix (Johnson et al., 1994, p. 267), J (;?)(xN) is semipositive. To complete
the proof, it su¢ ces to note that the slope ij(xN) changes sign when precisely one of the two
strategy spaces of players i and j is ipped around. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix a regular interior equilibrium xN of the generalized ordinal
potential game  . To prove the rst claim, let fi1; i2; i3g be any triplet of pairwise di¤erent
players. Clearly, one may rename the players such that i1 = 1, i2 = 2, and i3 = 3. Suppose rst
that   exhibits either strategic complements or strategic substitutes at xN . Thus, we assume
32E.g., let  = (123). Then, with i counting rows and j counting columns,
 =
0@ 0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0
1A . (104)
Therefore,
J(xN )(
)T =
0@ 0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0
1A0@ 0  31(xN )  32(xN )13(xN ) 0  12(xN )
23(x

N ) 21(x

N ) 0
1A0@ 0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0
1A (105)
=
0@ 0  12(xN ) 13(xN )21(xN ) 0 23(xN )
 31(xN )  32(xN ) 0
1A (106)
=
0B@ 0  
(;?)
12 (x

N )  (;?)13 (xN )

(;?)
21 (x

N ) 0  (;?)23 (xN )

(;?)
31 (x

N ) 
(;?)
32 (x

N ) 0
1CA , (107)
consistent with relationship (108).
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that either ij(xN)  0 for all i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g with j 6= i (in the case of strategic complements),
or ij(xN)  0 for all i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g with j 6= i (in the case of strategic substitutes). In this
case, one ips around player 2s strategy space, yet leaves unchanged the order in which the
nite sequence is run through (i.e.,  = id and F = f2g). Then, by Lemma 5, the modied
matrix
J3  J (id,f2g)(xN) =
0@ 0 12(xN)  13(xN) 21(xN) 0 23(xN)
31(x

N)  32(xN) 0
1A (109)
cannot be inverse nonnegative. To prove (35), it su¢ ces to show that the determinant of J3,
jJ3j = 12(xN)23(xN)31(xN)  21(xN)32(xN)13(xN), (110)
vanishes. To provoke a contradiction, suppose rst that jJ3j > 0. Then, from the temporary
assumption of either strategic complements or strategic substitutes at xN , all the entries of the
matrix inverse of J3,
(J3)
 1 =
1
jJ3j
0@ 23(xN)32(xN) 13(xN)32(xN) 12(xN)23(xN)31(xN)23(xN) 13(xN)31(xN) 21(xN)13(xN)
21(x

N)32(x

N) 12(x

N)31(x

N) 12(x

N)21(x

N)
1A , (111)
are nonnegative, in contradiction to the earlier conclusion that J3 is not inverse nonnegative.
Hence, jJ3j  0. Suppose next that jJ3j < 0. Then, by running through the same path in the
opposite direction (e.g., by letting  = (13) and F = f2g), one obtains from Lemma 5 that
J 03  J ((13);f2g)(xN) =
0@ 0  12(xN) 13(xN)21(xN) 0  23(xN)
 31(xN) 32(xN) 0
1A =  J3 (112)
is not inverse nonnegative. The matrix inverse of J 03 is consequently given by (J
0
3)
 1 =  (J3) 1.
Hence, in this case, recalling (111) and jJ3j < 0, all entries of (J 03) 1 are nonnegative, in
contradiction to the fact that J 03 is not inverse nonnegative. It follows that jJ3j = 0, which
proves the rst claim in the case where   exhibits either strategic complements or strategic
substitutes at xN . Next, we drop the assumption that   exhibits either strategic complements
or strategic substitutes at xN . From Proposition 1, we know, however, that   exhibits pairwise
strategic complements or substitutes at xN . Hence, up to another renaming of the players,
there are only two cases:
(i) Strategic complements at xN between player 1 and each of players 2 and 3, as well as strategic
substitutes at xN between players 2 and 3;
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(ii) Strategic substitutes at xN between player 1 and each of players 2 and 3, as well as strategic
complements at xN between players 2 and 3.
In either case, by ipping around the strategy space of player 1, the game may be transformed
into a game that exhibits either strategic substitutes at xN or strategic complements at x

N .
Since the operation of ipping around individual strategy spaces does not a¤ect the validity of
equation (35), we nd that the equation indeed holds generally in the case of three players.
The proof for m  4 follows now easily by induction. To see this, let fi1; i2; :::; img be
an arbitrary set of pairwise di¤erent players. Suppose that the claim holds for any m0 2
f3; 4; :::;m   1g. Then, in particular, a consideration of the two subsets fi1; i2; :::; im 1g and
fim 1; im; i1g shows that
i1i2(x

N)  :::  im 2im 1(xN)  im 1i1(xN) = i2i1(xN)  :::  im 1im 2(xN)  i1im 1(xN), (113)
im 1im(x

N)  imi1(xN)  i1im 1(xN) = imim 1(xN)  i1im(xN)  im 1i1(xN). (114)
Taking the respective products of the left-hand and right-hand sides of these equations yields
 
i1i2(x

N)  :::  im 1im(xN)  imi1(xN)
   im 1i1(xN)  i1im 1(xN)
=
 
i2i1(x

N)  :::  im 1im(xN)  i1im(xN)
   i1im 1(xN)  im 1i1(xN) . (115)
By assumption, i1im 1(x

N) 6= 0 and im 1i1(xN) 6= 0. Hence, eliminating the common nonzero
factors, (115) implies
i1i2(x

N)  :::  im 1im(xN)  imi1(xN) = i2i1(xN)  :::  im 1im(xN)  i1im(xN), (116)
as claimed. This concludes the induction argument, and therefore proves the proposition. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Let xN be an interior regular Nash equilibrium such that ij(x

N) 6= 0
for all i 6= j. We need to nd positive constants w1(xN) > 0; :::; wn(xN) > 0 such that
ij(x

N)wi(x

N) = ji(x

N)wj(x

N) (i; j 2 N; j 6= i). (117)
It is claimed that
wi(x

N) = (j12(xN)j  :::  ji 1i(xN)j)  (ji+1i(xN)j  :::  jnn 1(xN)j) (i 2 N) (118)
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does the job. Clearly, it su¢ ces to check (117) for i < j. Splitting the product in the second
bracket of (118), and plugging the result into the left-hand side of (117), one obtains
ij(x

N)wi(x

N) = (j12(xN)j  :::  ji 1i(xN)j)
 sgn(ij(xN))  ji+1i(xN)j  :::  jjj 1(xN)j  jij(xN)j (119)
 (jj+1j(xN)j  :::  jnn 1(xN)j) .
From Proposition 1 and the assumption that slopes do not vanish,
sgn(ij(xN)) = sgn(ji(x

N)). (120)
Moreover, from Proposition 2,
i+1i(x

N)  :::  jj 1(xN)  ij(xN) = ii+1(xN)  :::  j 1j(xN)  ji(xN). (121)
Plugging (120) and (121) into relationship (119) delivers
ij(x

N)wi(x

N) = (j12(xN)j  :::  ji 1i(xN)j)
 sgn(ji(xN))  jii+1(xN)j  :::  jj 1j(xN)j  jji(xN)j (122)
 (jj+1j(xN)j  :::  jnn 1(xN)j)
= ji(x

N)wj(x

N). (123)
This proves the claim and, hence, the corollary. 
Proof of Corollary 2. See the text before the corollary. 
Proof of Corollary 3. It su¢ ces to note that, at any symmetric equilibrium xN , the matrix
J (;F )(xN) is skew-symmetric for any bijection  : N ! N and for any subset F  N . 
Proof of Corollary 4. (Only if) From Proposition 1, 12(xN)21(x

N)  0. However, from
the zero-sum property and Schwarzs theorem,
sgn(
@2u1(x

N)
@x2@x1
) =  sgn(@
2u2(x

N)
@x2@x1
) =  sgn(@
2u2(x

N)
@x1@x2
). (124)
Hence, sgn(12(xN)) =  sgn(21(xN)), and consequently 12(xN) = 21(xN) = 0. (If) Immedi-
ate. 
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List of symbols (not for publication)
 , N = f1; :::; ng game, set of players
Xi  R, xi; bxi; x#i player is strategy set, typical elements
ui : XN  X1  :::Xn ! R player is payo¤ function
i = @ui=@xi marginal payo¤
xN = (x

1; :::; x

n) 2 XN Nash equilibrium
x i = (x1; :::; xi 1; xi+1; :::; xn); X i strategy prole of is opponents, set
i  i(x i)  (x i;xN) player is local best-response function
U  X i a small open neighborhood of x i
ij = ij(x

N) slope of i at x

N and w.r.t j
P : XN ! R potential function
:::! x0N ! x1N ! :::! xL 1N ! ::: strict improvement cycle (of length L)
(l) player changing xlN to x
l+1
N
N = (1; :::; n)
T 2 Rn vector of coe¢ cients
A 2 Rnn; bA 2 Rnm; eA 2 Rmm square, sub-, and principal submatrix
Rn++ = fzN 2 Rn : zN > 0g open positive orthant
A 1 matrix inverse of A
 : XN ! R auxiliary function
x i;j; X i;j strategy prole (excluding i and j), set
"; "1; "2; "3 small positive constants
Vi; V player is valuation, common valuation
J 2 Rnn slope matrix
 : N ! N; id; (i1:::im); F  N permutations, set of ippedplayers
J (;F ); 
(;F )
ij ; sgn(d); Ifi2Fg signed slope (matrix), sign, indicator
i1; ::::; im pairwise distinct players
ij 6= 0; bi 2 R; ci > 0; Ci(:) parameters, cost function
Qi > 0; si > 0; ij 6= 0; i(:) parameters, cost function
Ui(xi; x i); i aggregative game payo¤, slope
X symmetric strategy space
(x
(1)
i ; :::; x
(di)
i ) player is strategy (multi-dimensional)
Hij 2 Rdidj matrix of cross-derivatives
i = (
(1)
i ; :::; 
(d1)
i ) 2 Rdinf0g direction
x N = (x
 
1 ; x
 
2 ); x
+
N = (x
+
1 ; x
+
2 ) two strategy prolesex N(:); ex+N(:) further strategy proles
# = ( 1 ; 
+
1 ; 
 
2 ; 
+
2 ) 2 R4 vector
r(x N ; x+N) 2 R44 an auxiliary matrix
+i (:);
 
i (:);
+
j (:);
 
j (:) payo¤ di¤erences (two players)
J; J3; J
0
3 auxiliary matrices
x
(i;+)
N (:); x
(i; )
N (:) points in the strict improvement cycle
(i;+)(:);(i; )(:) payo¤ di¤erences (n players)
 = fijg permutation matrix
m0 positive integer used in the induction
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